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1. Introduction 
Since before the Industrial Revolution, exponential economic growth has supported rising 
standards of living around the world. Ever-increasing use of natural resources, notably energy from 
fossil fuels, has been key to the process. Climate change is a civilization-threatening consequence. 
Increasing temperature and more frequent natural disasters will impact the economy in many ways, 
inflicting damage on output and assets. Here we present a model of economic growth based on 
Keynesian aggregate demand theory to study how climate feedbacks affect the long-run evolution of 
the economy. 
Traditional growth theory attempts to explain sustained exponential increases of labor 
productivity and income. Early contributions such as Solow’s influential model focused on capital 
accumulation as the engine of growth. Capital deepening (a higher capital/labor ratio) supposedly 
allows workers to be more productive (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946; Solow, 1956). This tradition of 
growth theory sees technological progress -- due to either scientific and technological developments 
external to the economy or investment in research and development -- as the other main driver of 
growth. Innovations can be technological or organizational such as the division of labor across and 
within industries. Decreasing costs due to economies of scale also play a role (Smith, 1776). Potential 
output is determined by the size and skills of the labor force, the accumulated capital stock, and the 
available technology. In supply-driven mainstream models it will always be realized through full 
employment of the available resources.  
An important alternative conception of economic growth, based on Keynes’ theory of 
aggregate demand, developed in the work of Nicholas Kaldor, Michal Kalecki and Joan Robinson, 
emphasizes demand as the immediate driver of production and income growth in capitalist economies. 
The model we present here combines such a short-run demand-determined model of output with a 
model (inspired by Kaldor’s thinking on economies of scale) of endogenous long-run technical change 
depending on the growth of output. We follow the Kaldorian tradition of linking capital accumulation 
with technological progress: high demand calls forth higher output and income, which over time lead 
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to accumulation and provide a macroeconomic explanation for productivity beyond standard growth 
theory.  
An important strand of thought in ecological economics emphasizes that increasing labor 
productivity has historically gone hand in hand with rising productive use of energy (Taylor, 2008). 
Since the 19th century, fossil fuels have been the principal source (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; 
Cleveland et al., 1984; Ayres and Warr, 2009). We extend the standard model of economic growth to 
allow for this productivity-energy link directly. As a virtuous circle of economic growth and 
technological progress boosts standards of living, the need for natural resources and energy increases. 
So long as energy is derived from carbon-emitting fossil fuels, however, concentration of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases increases and climate damage worsens.  In 
principle, mitigation efforts can allow energy generation without the emission of carbon dioxide (and 
other greenhouse gases), severing the negative climate feedback and resolving the dilemma. 
Mitigation efforts also have an impact on levels of employment and the distribution of income, which 
our current model can track. 
Whether growth is socially sustainable is a further question (Foley, 2012). Mainstream growth 
theory assumes that labor and capital are fully employed and that the distribution of income between 
wages and profits is set by their technically determined “marginal” contributions to output. The 
alternative Keynesian tradition treats output as determined by demand.  Income distribution has an 
immediate impact on output and growth. If there is insufficient demand for labor, unemployment 
results. For a given level of economic activity, higher labor productivity destroys jobs. High levels of 
unemployment weaken the bargaining position of workers and lead to lower wages. Faster 
productivity growth has the potential to increase living standards but also the potential for a less equal 
distribution of income and lower levels of employment. Climate change worsens the problem. 
The economics of economic growth, labor productivity, climate change, and the distribution of 
distribution are well established but have been seen as mostly separate from each other. Climate 
change economics mostly uses supply-driven growth models in which the distribution of income is 
derived from marginal productivity rules and assumptions about the shape of production function 
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isoquants (Nordhaus, 2014). Non-neoclassical growth theory which does address the interaction of 
distribution and output determination, but has only recently begun to study the question of energy use 
and climate change (Taylor, 2004, 2008). The emerging field of Ecological Macroeconomics tries to 
bridge this divide, in particular, the contradiction between stimulation of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gas emissions by higher energy use to support output and retardation of production by climate damage 
(for a review see Rezai and Stagl, 2016). A natural extension is to study endogenous productivity 
growth and its implications for the distribution of income and aggregate demand.  
In the short run in our model, economic output is determined by aggregate demand that 
depends on the distribution of income, labor productivity, the amount of accumulated capital, and 
climate change. If the economy is operating at a high level of aggregate demand, employment grows 
and the distribution of income shifts towards labor. Greenhouse gas accumulation accelerates. Both 
factors induce a squeeze on profits, which ultimately limits demand.  
Over a period of decades, ongoing climate change lowers profitability and investment 
sufficiently to reduce output to sustainable levels where emissions and climate change stabilize. This 
process will entail overshooting of emissions and atmospheric carbon concentrations and cyclical 
adjustment due to the long lags in the climate system. The impacts on the distribution of income and 
employment levels will depend on society’s institutions. Mitigation has the potential to take off the 
brakes: decarbonizing energy generation avoids carbon emissions and reduces the negative impact of 
growth-induced climate change. In the absence of other resource limitations, the economy resumes a 
stable path of continued economic and labor productivity growth. In section 3 we present illustrative 
numerical simulations of the model, with details of the specification in the appendix.  
2. A Post-Keynesian model of economic growth and climate change 
Keynesian models basically say that spending determines income which  includes profits 𝑃 
and wages 𝑊.  In practice, a portion of profits is retained within business (with an implicit saving rate 
of 100%)  and the rest distributed to households via interest, dividends, and capital gains. Rich 
households receive the bulk of distributed profits; the remainder with low or negative saving rates 
mostly receive wages (and government transfers). These observations suggest that the saving rate from 
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profits (𝑠𝑐) exceeds the rate from wages (𝑠𝑤). The profit rate is equal to profits over capital stock, 𝑟 =
𝑃/𝐾, the wage share equals wages over total income, 𝜓 = 𝑊/𝑋 ,and the profit share is 𝜋 = 𝑃 𝑋⁄ =
1 − 𝜓.   
Aggregate private sector saving is  
(1) 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑐𝑃 + 𝑠𝑤𝑊 = 𝑠𝑐𝑟 𝐾 + 𝑠𝑤𝜓 𝑋 = 𝑠𝑐𝑟 𝐾 + 𝑠𝑤(1 − 𝜋)𝑋 = (𝑠𝑐 − 𝑠𝑤) 𝑟 𝐾 + 𝑠𝑤𝑋  
with  𝑟𝐾 = 𝜋𝑋.    
Firms hire labor at the total wage bill W. They also undertake investment into new capital stoc. 
We assume a linear independent investment function in which capital formation responds to profits 
and economic activity. Autonomous investment is scaled to capital via the coefficient 𝑔0.  
(2) 𝐼 = 𝛼 𝑃 + 𝛽 𝑋 + 𝑔0𝐾.     
Output creates emissions which lead to climate change. The government spends a fraction of 
GDP on mitigation to reduce these emissions. Throughout this section we assume that it does so 
without balancing its books and ignore business cycle complications. 1  Total mitigation expenditure 𝑀  
is thus proportional to output, 
(3) 𝑀 = 𝑚 𝑋.     
Under “business-as-usual” (BAU) the government does not undertake any mitigation, 𝑚 = 0. 
In the model at hand, the level of the capital stock, 𝐾, scales the system. Its use is not subject 
to decreasing returns so that marginal productivity rules to determine 𝑟 and 𝜋 do not apply. As 
described in equation (7) below, growth of capital stimulates rising labor productivity. 
2.1. Short run equilibrium 
                                                          
1 Our assumption of the government taxing the private sector and using these funds to finance mitigation efforts 
is a simplification which allows by-passing the intricate dynamics of the energy system. In a more decentralized 
framework, the government would use several policy instruments (e.g. carbon taxes, renewable subsidies) in 
addition to direct investments to guide private investment behavior.  
5 
In accordance with the principle of effective demand, output adjusts in the short run so that 
saving equals the sum of conventional and mitigation investment. At any time the capital stock is 
given and the output-capital ratio, 𝑢 = 𝑋/𝐾, equals2 
(4) 𝑢 =
𝑔0+𝑚+[𝛼−(𝑠𝑐−𝑠𝑤)]𝑟
𝑠𝑤−𝛽
. 
The Keynesian stability condition requires that investment responds less strongly than savings to 
output so 𝑠𝑤 > 𝛽.
3 Output responds positively to profits in the short run if 𝛼 > (𝑠𝑐 − 𝑠𝑤). Higher 
government expenditure to fight global warming, which in this section is financed by public debt, 
increases output unambiguously. Given a level of labor productivity, 𝜉, output determines 
employment: 𝐿 = 𝑋 𝜉⁄ . Higher output increases employment, while higher productivity at a given 
level of output leads to loss of jobs. Output is constrained by aggregate demand, not aggregate supply, 
in our model. This implies that output remains below capacity, despite aggregate demand and supply 
equalize much quicker than the geological time scales considered in our model (see Taylor (2004) and 
Lavoie (2014) for introductions to demand-constrained traditions). 
The distribution of income is determined in the labor market (Goodwin, 1967): if demand is 
strong and employment high, workers can bid for higher wages and the wage share rises. If the 
economy is going through a slump, unemployment increases and the labor share falls. We capture this 
relation in a linear equation for the profit rate.4 The distribution of income is also impacted by 
damages from climate change. We assume that damages are borne by business owners and hence 
lower the profit rate.5 Let 𝜆 =
𝐿
𝑁
= 𝜁𝑢 with 𝜆 as the employment rate, 𝐿, relative to population, 𝑁, and 
𝜁 = 𝜅 𝜉⁄  as the ratio of capital intensity (𝜅 = 𝐾 𝑁)⁄  to labor productivity discussed further below. Let 
                                                          
2 Equation (4) follows from solving (1) – (3) for X and dividing by K. The ratio 𝑢 is basically a scale-free gauge 
of economic activity. As discussed below, its level feeds back into the profit rate. 
3 The stability condition ensures that a small demand injection (e.g. consumption or investment) is met by larger 
demand leakage (e.g. saving) such that overall demand moves back towards its previous level. In this case the 
equilibrium level of output is dynamically stable. 
4 The profit rate and the profit share are related by the identity: 𝑟 = 𝜋 𝑢. A positive relationship between 𝑢 and 𝜋 
implies a positive relationship between 𝑢 and 𝑟.  
5 Climate damage will initially create losses for business owners due to lower profitability. This reasoning 
motivates our assumption on a negative effect on the profit rate. Through endogenous processes within the 
economy, business owners can shift some of these losses on to workers by lowering the wage bill. A lower level 
of profitability lowers growth in income and labor productivity. Rezai et al. (2013) discuss the problems of 
incorporating climate damages in demand-driven models and how such damages can be interpreted. 
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the atmospheric stock of carbon be denoted by 𝐺. Then distributional conflict is captured by the 
relationship 
(5) 𝑟 = 𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝜆 − 𝜇2𝐺 = 𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝜁𝑢 − 𝜇2𝐺. 
The profit rate, 𝑟, falls as the labor market tightens if 𝜇1 > 0 which also implies that 𝑟  falls if 𝑢 
increases. This response reflects a “profit squeeze” distributive regime (Taylor, 2004).  There is a 
similar squeeze in profitability if greenhouse gas concentration, 𝐺, rises. By increasing 𝜁 at a given 
level of productivity, greater capital intensity 𝜅 forces the profit rate to fall. 
The short run equilibrium, as defined by equations (4) and (5), gives the level and distribution 
of income, 𝑢 and 𝑟.6 Using these variables we can also solve equation (2) for the ratio of gross 
investment to capital, 𝑔 = 𝐼 𝐾⁄ , which will determine the growth rate of capital stock.  
These short run variables are conditional on the levels of the dynamic state variables, 𝐺 and 𝜁. 
After substituting equation (4) into equation (5), we can determine their direct and indirect influence 
on the short run variables in the following manner: 𝑟 = 𝑟[𝜁, 𝐺], 𝑢 = 𝑢[𝑟], 𝑔 = 𝑔[𝑟, 𝑢[𝑟]], so that 𝑢 
and 𝑔 are affected  indirectly by climate change through its effect on the profit rate.  
We assume that the economy is in a profit-led demand regime, i.e. 𝛼 > (𝑠𝑐 − 𝑠𝑤), and a 
profit-squeeze distributive regime, i.e. 𝜇1 > 0. Under the profit-led/profit-squeeze assumption, the 
profit rate falls if either of the state variables or output increases. Using subscripts to denote partial 
derivatives, in equation (5) we have 𝑟𝜁, 𝑟𝐺, 𝑟𝑢 < 0. In equation (4), output increases with the profit 
rate, 𝑢𝑟 > 0. In equation (2), the investment/capital ratio goes down as well, 𝑔𝜁, 𝑔𝐺 < 0. 
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the short-run equilibrium. Output, 𝑢(𝑟), increases 
with the profit rate due to the assumption of profit-led demand. The profit rate 𝑟(𝑢, 𝜁, 𝐺) decreases 
with output due to the assumption of a profit-squeeze. The intersection of both schedules determines 
                                                          
6 The closed-form solution to equations (4) and (5) reads:  
𝑢 =
(𝑔0+𝑚)+(𝛼1−𝑠𝑐+𝑠𝑤)(𝜇2 𝐺+𝜇0)
(𝑠𝑤−𝛽)+𝜇1 𝜁(𝛼−𝑠𝑐+𝑠𝑤)
 and  
𝑟 =
(𝑠𝑤−𝛽)(𝜇0+𝜇2 𝐺)−𝜇1 (𝑔0+𝑚)𝜁
(𝑠𝑤−𝛽)+𝜇1(𝛼1−𝑠𝑐+𝑠𝑤)
 . 
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the short run equilibrium, A. Both 𝑢 and 𝑟 fall in response to an increase in either state variable. In 
Figure 1 an increase in the stock of atmospheric carbon to G’ shifts the distribution schedule 
downward. Both 𝑢 and 𝑟 are lower in the new equilibrium, B. 
Figure 1 
Since the focus of this paper is the long run, we abstract from short- to medium-run fluctuations 
and assume that the demand and distributive variables adjust instantly. In reality, output and 
distribution adjust in response to each other, giving rise to cyclical patterns in a profit-led/profit-
squeeze economy. These cycles of demand and the functional income distribution are usually studied 
within a Goodwin model (Barbosa and Taylor, 2006). Work by Kiefer and Rada (2014) suggests that 
the demand-side effect of 𝑟 on 𝑢 is weak so that that 𝑢(𝑟) schedule in Figure 1 is steep. This implies 
that capital utilization will not fall by very much in response to moderate increases in 𝜁 and 𝐺. 
2.2. Long run dynamics 
In the short run the capital stock, labor productivity, and greenhouse gas concentration are 
fixed but they evolve over time. Capital increases through net investment, i.e. gross investment minus 
depreciation. Here we allow for a second climate impact: higher level of greenhouse gases lead to a 
faster depreciation. To allow for population growth, we work with the capital/population ratio, 𝜅 =
𝐾 𝑁⁄ . Population grows at an exogenous rate, 𝑛. In summary, 𝜅 increases according to 
(6) ?̇? = 𝜅(𝑔 − 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐺 − 𝑛)          
with 𝛿0 and 𝛿1𝐺 as the exogenous and climate-change related rates of depreciation and 𝑔 = 𝐼 𝐾⁄  as 
gross investment from equation (2). In standard notation, ?̇? =  𝑑𝜅 𝑑𝑡⁄  and ?̂? = ?̇? 𝜅⁄ . 
As discussed in the introduction, labor productivity 𝜉 is a major source of rising output. What 
factors determine its growth rate, 𝜉?  Kaldor emphasized the demand side. Over the years he 
introduced two versions of a “technical progress function.” In the first 𝜉 is driven by investment which 
serves as a vehicle for more productive technology (Kaldor, 1957). The second ties productivity 
growth to the output growth rate ?̂? via economies of scale (Kaldor, 1966). To keep the model 
tractable, we assume that 𝜉 responds to ?̂? which is driven by the investment/capital ratio 𝑔. Higher 
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employment may also stimulate labor-saving technical change as in the induced technical change 
model proposed by Kennedy and von Weizsacker (Kennedy, 1964; von Weizsacker, 1966). As the 
labor market tightens and the wage bill increases, firms seek more productive operations to save on the 
increased cost for labor. In growth rate form, 𝜉 evolves according to 
(7) 𝜉 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1?̂? + 𝛾2(𝜆 − ?̅?) 
where 𝛾0 > 0 is the exogenous rate of productivity growth, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 capture the effects of capital 
deepening and labor market tightness, and ?̅? is the rate of employment at which no additional 
productivity investments are undertaken.  
For mathematical ease, we will work with the auxiliary variable 𝜁 = 𝜅 𝜉⁄ = 𝜆 𝑢 ⁄  introduced 
above.  This ratio of capital (relative to population) to productivity provides a natural vehicle to track 
the system. While 𝜅 and 𝜉 have their own dynamics, they are fixed at a point in time and have to 
approach a constant growth rate in the long run. They map into 𝜆 𝑢 ,⁄   the employment ratio divided by 
capital utilization. Using (6) and (7), the growth rate equation for 𝜁, 𝜁 = ?̂? − 𝜉, simplifies to 
(8) 𝜁̇ = 𝜁[(1 − 𝛾1)(𝑔 − 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐺 − 𝑛) − 𝛾0 − 𝛾2(𝜁𝑢 − ?̅?)]     . 
 The stock of atmospheric carbon is the third state variable. Carbon accumulates due to 
production related emissions and dissipates at a low exogenous rate 𝜔. Emissions are determined by 
the size of the economy, X, its energy use per unit output (i.e. the inverse of energy productivity, 𝜀 =
𝑋 𝐸⁄  with 𝐸 as energy use), and the carbon intensity of the energy used, 𝜒. Falling effectiveness of 
mitigation expenditure in curbing production-related fossil fuel emissions is captured by an increasing 
concave function 𝜃(𝑚). As 𝑚 rises, mitigation control becomes less effective according to 1 − 𝜃(𝑚).7 
There are also natural emissions 𝐻0 which must enter the accounting. 
 Most economic models of climate change assume that energy productivity is constant so that, 
ceteris paribus, emissions are a fixed proportion of output or are changing exogenously along a 
                                                          
7 In our modeling we follow the DICE model of Nordhaus (2014) in assuming a continuum of available energy 
generating processes which increase in price as their emitted carbon content falls. We abstract from the 
complexities that the transition to a carbon-neutral energy sector implies. Importantly, we assume that full 
mitigation is feasible at relative low cost. We also abstract from the varying abilities of energy sources to provide 
usable work for economic processes (Ayres and Warr, 2009; Hall et al., 2014). 
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declining trend. Historically, however, energy use per worker, 𝑞 = 𝐸 𝐿⁄ , tends to increase with labor 
productivity (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; Cleveland et al., 1984; Ayres and Warr, 2009; Semieniuk, 
2016). Given the identity noted by Taylor (2008) 
(9) 𝜀 =
𝑋
𝐸
=
𝑋/𝐿
𝐸/𝐿
=
𝜉
𝑞
,  
 this empirical pattern implies that the emissions are intimately related to labor productivity i.e. to 
increase output per worker, energy use per worker has to rise. We capture this relationship by 
assuming a constant elasticity between energy use per worker and labor productivity: ?̂? = 𝜐𝜉, or in 
level terms at time 𝑡: 𝑞(𝑡) = [𝑞(0) 𝜉(0)𝜐]𝜉(𝑡)𝜐 = 𝐶𝜉(𝑡)𝜐⁄  with 𝑞(0) and 𝜉(0) as levels of the 
variables at time zero.  Using identity (9) we find that 1 𝜀⁄ = 𝐶𝜉𝜐−1. Semieniuk (2016) estimated the 
elasticity 𝜐 as being close to unity, the value we adopt in the following discussion.  
 With emissions responding endogenously to economic growth and the energy need embodied 
in technological progress, 𝐺 evolves according to 
(10) ?̇? = 𝐻0 +  [1 − 𝜃(𝑚)]𝜒𝐸 − 𝜔𝐺 = 𝐻0 + [1 − 𝜃(𝑚)]𝜒𝑁𝑢𝜅𝐶𝜉
𝜐−1 − 𝜔𝐺. 
The first equality states that the change in atmospheric carbon is natural plus unabated output-
linked emissions minus dissipation at rate 𝜔 due to biological uptake. The second uses the identities 
𝐸 = 𝑋 𝜀⁄ , 𝑋 = 𝑁𝑢𝜅, and 𝜉 = 𝜅 𝜁⁄  and follows from the well-known “Kaya identity” from climate 
science (Waggoner and Ausubel, 2002). An important aspect of the equation is that atmospheric 
carbon is an increasing function of the size of the economy, 𝑋, at odds with the convention of 
continued exponential growth of 𝐺. At present the growth rate of 𝐺 is around one-half percent per year 
and climate damage is apparent. Meanwhile 𝜅 is increasing at around one or two percent.  In (10) the 
ratio 𝑋 𝐺 = 𝑁𝑢𝜅 𝐺⁄⁄  is rising with greater population and capital, meaning that the growth rate ?̂? is 
going up. The Malthusian logic of exponential growth shows that with incomplete mitigation (𝜃(𝑚) <
1) more rapidly increasing climate damage must choke off economic expansion in order to allow for a 
stabilization of 𝐺, 𝜅, and 𝜁 at a zero growth “stationary state.”  
A second point is that by raising capital utilization 𝑢, higher labor productivity increases the 
demand for energy.  Discussions on limits to growth and proposals for “de-growth” must recognize the 
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endogeneity of technological progress and how income is generated in capitalist societies for their 
policy implications to be relevant. 
2.3. Dynamic behavior and steady states 
 In the absence of adverse effects of climate change, the economy would approach balanced 
growth in the long run with all relevant variables increasing at the same constant rate. Climate change 
can force such reassuring dynamics to break down. To see why, we focus initially on the differential 
equations (6) and (8) for increases in 𝜅 and 𝜁. Will they converge to a steady state with ?̇? = 0 and 𝜁̇ = 
0, and what are the characteristics of this “attractor”? An implicit assumption is that the population 
growth rate 𝑛 is constant (possibly equal to zero at a stationary state). 
  As pointed out in connection with Figure 1, the short-run variables 𝑔 and 𝑢 entering (6) and 
(8) both decrease when 𝜁 and 𝐺 rise. Because capital scales the system, the  equations do not depend 
explicitly on 𝜅. In (6) signs of responses are ?̇?𝜅 = 0, ?̇?𝜁 < 0, ?̇?𝐺 < 0. In (8) the partial derivatives are 
𝜁?̇? = 0 and  𝜁?̇? < 0.  From the discussion of Figure 1, the impact of 𝜁 on 𝑢 in equation (8)  is likely to 
be small, so that the derivative 𝜁?̇? = 𝑑𝜁̇ 𝑑𝜁⁄ < 0.  
 Assume for the moment that climate change is irrelevant to growth. Such would be the case 
under full mitigation of all emissions or after a permanent transition to renewable energy, with 𝐺  
falling back to its pre-industrial level 𝐺0 discussed below.  The economy approaches a balanced 
growth path with a stable ratio of  𝜅 to 𝜉. The growth rate follows from the implied short run 
equilibrium, equations (4) – (6).8 
 If 𝜃(𝑚) < 1 in (10), greenhouse gas accumulation cannot be ignored. With   ?̇?𝜅 > 0 a higher 
level of economic activity increases atmospheric carbon concentration and balanced growth may break 
down. For a given level of 𝐺, two steady state conditions follow from (6) and (8) with ?̇? = 0 and 𝜁̇ =
0, 
(11) 𝑔 − 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐺 − 𝑛 = 0 
                                                          
8 Taylor et al. (2016) present the details of a similar demand-driven model of endogenous productivity and 
wealth distribution. 
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and 
(12) (1 − 𝛾1)(𝑔 − 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐺 − 𝑛) − 𝛾0 − 𝛾2(𝜁𝑢 − ?̅?) = 0  . 
Both are implicit equations between 𝐺 and 𝜁. In the jargon they are “nullclines” summarizing 
combinations of the state variables that hold ?̇? = 0 and 𝜁̇ = 0. Points of intersection of nullclines 
define overall steady states, if they exist. 
 Figure 2 gives a graphical representation. The effect of 𝐺 on 𝜁̇ is negative due to increased 
depreciation and slower capital accumulation so  (12) has a negative slope in the (𝐺, 𝜁) plane. Along 
this nullcline a higher 𝐺 would be associated with lower 𝜁. The small arrows signal how 𝜁 evolves. 
For example, if it lies above the nullcline then 𝜁 decreases (𝜅 grows less rapidly than 𝜉) until 𝜁̇ = 0.  
Figure 2 
 Equation (6) is a relationship among three variables -- ?̇?, 𝐺, and 𝜁. It can be interpreted in at 
least two ways. If  𝐺 is held constant, 𝜁 is set by (12) while ?̇? has to be determined from (6) as a 
function of 𝐺 and 𝜁. In Figure 2 different levels of ?̇? are plotted along contour lines. Since capital 
stock growth is reduced by higher levels of both state variables, lines further toward the right 
correspond to lower, and eventually negative, levels of ?̇?.  
  A stable configuration of the nullclines is shown in Figure 2. In equation (8) 𝜁̇ is not strongly 
affected by 𝐺 so the nullcline has a shallow slope. In equation (6) 𝐺 has a stronger negative impact 
than 𝜁 on ?̇? so the contour lines 
 are relatively steep. Under such circumstances, a high level of 𝐺 is associated with relatively low 
levels of 𝜁 and ?̇?  along the nullcline for ?̇?. In other words, higher GHG concentration leads to slower 
growth in the long run. With a low 𝜁, productivity is high relative to capital implying that employment 
is low and the profit rate high.  
 Bringing in dynamics of 𝐺, if 𝜃(𝑚) = 1 in (10), then ?̇? is driven solely by natural or pre-
industrial emissions. As 𝐺 decreases ?̇? would speed up, raising steady state 𝜁 and shifting the 
equilibrium point 𝑆𝑝 to the left. With a small 𝜔, climate damage would abate, over centuries, moving 
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toward the “full mitigation” equilibrium 𝑆𝑓 in Figure 2, at which steady state 𝐺
∗ reaches a sustainable 
pre-industrial level 𝐺0 = 𝐻0 𝜔⁄ . 
 In the far more realistic case of partial mitigation with 𝜃(𝑚) < 1, both 𝜁 and 𝐺 can arrive at 
steady states illustrated by the intersection of the nullclines (11) and (12) or point 𝑆𝑝 in Figure 2. 
Steady state 𝜅 has yet to be determined. That’s where the GHG accumulation equation (10) comes in. 
We already observed that the partial derivatives of ?̇? with respect to 𝜁 and 𝐺 are negative. With ?̇?𝐺 <
0,  (10) is a locally stable differential equation. In a Malthusian touch, ?̇? increases with population 𝑁. 
Unless mitigation can rise indefinitely to offset growing population the implication is that ultimately 
the system must arrive at a stationary state with ?̇? = ?̇? = 𝜁̇ = 𝑛 = 0. The level of 𝜅 follows from the 
nullcline for ?̇? = 0 which is  
(13)     [1 − 𝜃(𝑚)]𝜒𝑁𝑢𝜅𝐶𝜉𝜐−1 − 𝜔𝐺 = 0  .   
Because as discussed in connection with Figure 2, ?̇?𝐺 < 0 there is inherent cyclicality between 𝜅 and 
𝐺. Such cyclical dynamics imply an overshooting of levels of atmospheric carbon and the likelihood 
of a climate crisis to halt economic growth.  
A final question is whether the three-dimensional system is likely to be stable overall. As 
discussed below, with plausible numerical values the model can converge to a stationary state. As 
background, qualitative judgment helps clarify the process. At a stationary state, on the assumptions 
we have made the system’s Jacobian takes the form 
 𝜅 𝜁 𝐺 
?̇? 0 ?̇?𝜁 < 0 ?̇?𝐺 < 0 
𝜁̇ 0 𝜁?̇? < 0 𝜁?̇? < 0 
?̇? ?̇?𝜅 > 0 ?̇?𝜁 <0 ?̇?𝐺 <0 
 
.   Local stability is determined by three “Routh-Hurwitz conditions.” The first is that the 
Jacobian should have a negative trace. It is satisfied on our assumptions. The second is that the 
determinant should be negative. This condition  is satisfied as long as the nullclines take the form in 
Figure 2. The third condition is difficult to verify qualitatively. It states that the sum of the three 
principal sub-determinants must exceed the ratio of the determinant to the trace. As verified by the 
13 
simulation results just below, it. is likely to hold unless there is  particularly strong feedback between 
the concentration of atmospheric carbon  and the employment-utilization ratio.  
3. Simulations of a calibrated model 
 Analytically we have shown that, in the absence of ambitious climate policy, the economy 
may go through boom-and-bust cycles. In ecology, this behavior is known as predator-prey dynamics. 
Since output is prey with a slow recovery rate from (6), the cycles are likely to be damped. In this 
section we use a parameterized model calibrated to the world economy to study the dynamics 
numerically. Atmospheric temperature (degrees Celsius) is used instead of CO2 concentration to 
measure the impact of global warming. Following Nordhaus (2014), more complicated GHG 
dynamics replaces equation (10), making responsiveness of the model a bit “slower” than in our 
simple specification.9 Population is assumed to rise from 7 to 9 billion at the end of the century, 
stabilizing at 10 billion. The exogenous component of labor productivity grows at 1% per year initially 
but falls over time. 
 Figure 3 presents the simulations of growth and climate change for different levels of 
mitigation. There are three scenarios: (i) “BAU” (red, short-dashed) where no emission abatement 
takes place, (ii) “2°C target” (black, solid) has the share of unabated emissions falling 6% per year 
such that temperature stays within 2°C, and (iii) “Emission Mitigation” (green, long-dashed) holds 
new emissions equal to zero from the start. The cost of the “2°C” scenario peaks at 3% of GDP at mid-
century and falls thereafter. Full mitigation costs significantly more, starting at 6% of GDP initially 
and falling to 3% by the end of the century and 2% by 2150. 
Figure 3 
 The economy grows at 3% per year initially in all scenarios but the trajectories quickly 
diverge. In the “BAU” run, rapid growth generates high net emissions which translate into rising 
                                                          
9 We use the climate dynamics of DICE to increase the comparability of our results. From a scientific 
perspective a more detailed representation of all greenhouse gases (not just CO2) would be desirable. The 
numerical model also allows for non-linear specifications of climate damages, again, following Nordhaus 
(2014). The appendix discusses how the numerical and analytical models differ and provides a complete list of 
equations and parameter values. Given the assumption that economic institutions will remain constant over the 
complete time horizon, these simulations like all others have to be deemed illustrative. 
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global mean temperature, surpassing 4°C at the end of the century and stabilizing at 7°C in 300 years. 
As temperature rises and climate damages increase, the profit rate falls. Investment levels are 
insufficient to maintain aggregate demand and unemployment results. After this boom-bust cycle, 
output is back to its current level after 200 years but due to increases in labor productivity, 
employment relative to population falls from  40% to 15%. With the profit share fairly stable, this shift 
implies significant redistribution for working households. Those lucky enough to find employment are 
paid almost three times the current wage rate, but the others have to rely on subsistence income or 
public transfers. Only in the very long run, as labor productivity falls in response to rampant 
unemployment, can employment levels recover. But then the same amount of income spreads across 
more workers, since the overall size of the economy is limited by the climate constraint. Mitigation 
allows the economy to avoid stagnation. In the “2°C target” scenario, fiscal outlays are slowly ramped 
up.  
 The 2°C mitigation scenario allows the economy to continue its growth path with steady 
increases in the income per capita and growing employment. The transition to the steady state with 
higher levels of capital and lower profit rates is smooth without the disruption of a climate crisis. The 
full mitigation version does better at controlling warming than the 2°C scenario, but implies higher 
cost. Given that the economy of our model is demand-constraint this tax-and-mitigate policy increases 
output, employment, and growth. This full mitigation scenario, in which all emissions cease 
immediately, is dubious technically and even more so institutionally.  
4. Discussion by way of a conclusion 
 This paper supplements existing attempts to integrate economic and geophysical modeling of 
climate damage by focusing specifically on the impacts of climate change on the demand side of the 
economy. This is an important aspect because much of the existing literature makes the controversial 
assumption that economic institutions automatically lead to the full utilization of productive resources, 
and because many impacts of climate change immediately affect demand and the distribution of 
income, which is closely related to demand. Our demand-driven growth framework allows us to study 
the medium- to long-run impacts of climate damage and mitigation on variables like the utilization 
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rate, unemployment, and wages. The endogenous processes of labor productivity growth, distribution, 
and employment are essential to our analysis. This allows us to model the economic growth (i.e. 
growth in income) as an outcome generated in capitalist societies by policies rather than a policy 
variable itself.  
 As an anonymous referee for this journal usefully points out, there is a considerable difference 
in the credibility of the BAU and mitigation scenarios in our simulations. The BAU scenario implies 
that the world economic/geophysical system will encounter unprecedented conditions, such as a 7° C 
average temperature increase, for which we have little or no empirical historical evidence. We present 
these BAU simulations as a tentative attempt to quantify the unquantifiable, and to identify key points, 
both economic and geophysical, where major contradictions are likely to occur. These contradictions 
might involve catastrophic non-linear geophysical responses to extreme economic stresses, but equally 
well might involve revolutionary changes in the institutions that at present organize world economic 
production due to geophysical stresses. 
 We believe our mitigation scenarios are more robust precisely because they stay closer to the 
range of geophysical and economic conditions about which we have some empirical historical 
evidence. The main question hanging over the mitigation simulations is how much stress a shift to a 
low (essentially zero) carbon-dioxide emitting economic regime might put on existing economic 
institutions. We make the somewhat optimistic assumption that improvements in non-emitting 
technologies and gradual adoption of carbon-free energy sources will make this transition feasible, if 
admittedly challenging. The allowances in our mitigation scenarios for direct expenditures on 
mitigation (our broad concept for all measures to reduce emissions per unit of economic output) are 
quite large in absolute terms, although at 3-6% of world economic output fairly small in relative terms. 
 The key point, however, is that mitigation allows the economy to avoid economic stagnation 
and climate catastrophe, and therefore keeps both economic and geophysical conditions closer to 
historically known levels. We believe that an important and robust lesson from our modeling exercise 
is to underline that strong efforts at mitigation of global climate change need not be antagonistic to 
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economic performance or economic interests as measured by the traditional gauges of wage and profit 
incomes, employment and growth of the output of useful economic goods and services. 
 The BAU scenario underlines this same conclusion from a somewhat different point of view. 
If technological options for decarbonization are either unavailable or not deployed, economic output 
will have to be stabilized by a climate crash, in ways that will be very unfavorable to traditional 
economic indicators such as level and growth of output, distribution, and employment. In the 
mitigation scenarios, the control of CO2 emissions essential to avoid a crisis beginning a few decades 
in the future does take place, and our simulations support the conclusion that this level of mitigation 
can in fact improve economic performance measured by traditional indicators. Environmental and 
social-economic policy goals are mutually reinforcing so long as serious climate policy is 
implemented. 
 Either way, controlling CO2 is essential to avoid a crisis beginning a few decades in the 
future. Environmental and social goals are not mutually exclusive so long as serious climate policy is 
implemented. If technological options for decarbonization are either unavailable or not deployed, 
output will have to be stabilized by a climate crash. 
Appendix  
Numerical simulations are based on an extended model which allows for taxation, non-linear 
effects of climate change, and a more realistic representation of climate and population dynamics. 
Notation follows the main text. Our economy is calibrated to 2010 with global output of $60 trillion 
and capital stock of $200 trillion. Population is 6 billion people, employment roughly 3 billion, and 
global energy use per person about 2.5 kW/person (Semieniuk, 2016). Initial values for the climate 
system are taken from Nordhaus (2014). The parameters g_0 and Φ are calibrated to give u = 0.3 and 
π = 0.4 initially. Taylor et. al. (2017) provide supporting data for base year calibration. 
 
Variables 
𝑷𝒐𝒑 Population 
𝒖 Output – capital ratio: output per capital 
𝝃 Labor productivity: output per worker 
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𝜺 Energy productivity: output per energy unit 
𝝀 Employment share: workers / total population 
𝝅 Profit share: share of profits in income 
𝜿 Capital – population ratio: capital per capita 
𝒒 Energy per worker 
𝑿 Output 
𝒈 Investment rate: growth rate of capital 
𝒔 Saving rate: share of saving in income 
𝑻𝒂𝒕𝒎 Atmospheric Temperature 
𝒁 Climate damage, 𝟏 − 𝒁 is % lost due to climate change 
 
 
Parameters 
𝒎 
scenario-
dependent 
Mitigation share (% of GDP) 
𝝉 30% Tax share (% of GDP) 
𝒔𝒄 70% Saving propensity out of profits 
𝒔𝒘 5% Saving propensity out of wages 
𝜷 10% Government expenditure (% of capital) 
𝒈𝟎 -0.033 
Autonomous investment demand (scaled to capital stock), 
see calibration section below 
𝒈𝒖 0.1 Investment response to higher output 
𝒈𝒓 0.7 Investment response to higher profitability 
𝜹 5% Depreciation rate of capital 
𝑨 2 Employment share elasticity of the profit share 
𝑩 2 Climate damage elasticity of the profit share 
𝜱 0.2792 damage parameter, see calibration section below 
𝒏𝟎 0.015 population parameter, calibrated to give 0.5% initial growth 
𝜸𝟎 0.01 0.99
t Exogenous productivity growth, falling at 1%/year 
𝜸𝟏 0.5 Kaldor-Verdoorn effect 
𝜸𝟐 0.005 Kennedy-Weitzsäcker effect 
?̅? 0.5 Goodwin-neutral employment share 
𝝂 1 Elasticity between labor productivity and energy use 
 
 
Initial Conditions 
𝑷𝒐𝒑 7 billion 
κ 200 $T / 7 billion 
𝝃 60 $bn / 3 billion 
𝒒 2.5 kW / person 
 
With definitional identities 
 𝝀[𝒕] =
𝜿[𝒕]𝒖[𝒕]
𝝃[𝒕]
 
 𝒖[𝒕] =
𝑿[𝒕]
𝜿[𝒕]𝑷𝒐𝒑[𝒕]
 
 𝒔[𝒕] = 𝒔𝒘(𝟏 − 𝝅[𝒕]) + 𝒔𝒑𝝅[𝒕] 
 𝜺[𝒕] = 𝝃[𝒕] 𝒒[𝒕]⁄  
 
we can define the short run equilibrium 
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 𝑿[𝒕] = 𝒎 𝑿[𝒕] + (𝟏 − 𝝉 − 𝒔[𝒕])𝑿[𝒕] + 𝜷 𝐏𝐨𝐩[𝒕] 𝜿[𝒕] + 𝒈[𝒕] 𝐏𝐨𝐩[𝒕] 𝜿[𝒕] 
 𝒈[𝒕] = 𝐠𝟎 + 𝐠𝐮𝒖[𝒕] + 𝜶 𝒖[𝒕]𝝅[𝒕] 
 𝝅[𝒕] = (𝜱𝒁[𝒕])𝑩(𝝀[𝒕])−𝑨. 
  
 Note that in the numerical model, the profit share is a non-linear function of the labor market 
and climate damages. Aggregate demand now also includes government taxation and non-mitigation 
expenditure (which is scaled to capital stock rather than GDP to match empirically observed effects of 
expenditure on output). 
 Given the short run equilibrium, we can turn to the dynamic equations of the model just below. 
The first equation is exogenous population growth, which follows logistic growth with maximum 
population set to 10 billion. With 𝒏[𝒕] = 𝑷𝒐𝒑̇ [𝒕]/𝑷𝒐𝒑[𝒕] equal to population growth, the second 
equation reproduces equation (6) from the main text. The last two equations restate equation (7) and 
the energy-labor productivity nexus from the text.  
 𝑷𝒐𝒑̇ [𝒕] = 𝒏𝟎(𝟏 −
𝑷𝒐𝒑[𝒕]
𝟏𝟎
)𝑷𝒐𝒑[𝒕] 
 ?̇?[𝒕] = 𝜿[𝒕](𝒈[𝒕] − 𝜹 −
𝑷𝒐𝒑̇ [𝒕]
𝑷𝒐𝒑[𝒕]
) 
 ?̇?[𝒕] = 𝝃[𝒕](𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏?̇?[𝒕]/𝜿[𝒕] + 𝜸𝟐(𝝀[𝒕] − ?̅?)) 
 ?̇?[𝒕] =
𝒒[𝒕]?̇?[𝒕]
𝝂𝝃[𝒕]
 
 
Our climate model is taken from the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2014) and parameterized to an 
annual scale (Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2017). In the carbon cycle, carbon diffuses between the 
atmosphere (𝑀AT), and the upper (𝑀UP) and lower (𝑀LO) parts of the oceans following a Markov 
process. Higher levels of atmospheric carbon increase radiative forcing, which directly increases 
global atmospheric temperature, 𝑇atm, while some of this additional energy is taken up by the ocean 
over time, increasing oceanic temperature, 𝑇LO. The exogenous forcing component increases linearly 
from 0 W/m² to 0.45 W/m² at the end of the century. Emissions, (1 − 𝜃)
𝜒[𝑡]𝑋[𝑡]
𝜀[𝑡]
, are calibrated to 10 
GtC initially. The dynamics of carbon intensity, 𝜒[𝑡], are also taken from DICE. 
 
 (
𝑴𝑨𝑻[𝒕]
𝑴𝑼𝑷[𝒕]
𝑴𝑳𝑶[𝒕]
) = (𝟏 − 𝜽)
𝝌[𝒕]𝑿[𝒕]
𝜺[𝒕]
(
𝟏
𝟎
𝟎
) + 𝚵 (
𝑴𝑨𝑻[𝒕 − 𝟏]
𝑴𝑼𝑷[𝒕 − 𝟏]
𝑴𝑳𝑶[𝒕 − 𝟏]
) 
 (
𝑻𝒂𝒕𝒎[𝒕]
𝑻𝑳𝑶[𝒕]
) = 𝜰 (
𝑻𝒂𝒕𝒎[𝒕 − 𝟏]
𝑻𝑳𝑶[𝒕 − 𝟏]
) + 𝜣 (
𝜼𝟐𝑳𝒏[
𝑴𝑨𝑻[𝒕]
𝑴𝑨𝑻𝟏𝟕𝟓𝟎
]
𝑳𝒏[𝟐]
+ 𝑭𝑬𝑿[𝒕])  
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with  
 
𝚵 = (
𝟎. 𝟗𝟖𝟏𝟒𝟑𝟔 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟎𝟗𝟑𝟗 −𝟏. 𝟏𝟐𝟑 𝟏𝟎−𝟔
𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟓𝟖𝟑 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟑𝟗𝟕 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟔𝟖𝟕
−𝟏. 𝟗𝟏 𝟏𝟎−𝟓 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟓𝟎𝟖𝟗 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟑𝟐
), 
 𝜰 = (
𝟎. 𝟗𝟕𝟎𝟗𝟑𝟐 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓𝟑𝟓𝟒𝟕𝟓
𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟒𝟕𝟏𝟖 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟒𝟗𝟑
), 
 𝜣 = (
𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟕𝟕𝟑𝟒 
−𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟏𝟕𝟐
). 
 
The damage function of DICE is adapted to account for potentially catastrophic losses at high 
levels of temperature (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012), 
 𝒁[𝒕] =
𝟏
𝟏+𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟒𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒕𝒎[𝒕]𝟐+𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟓𝟎𝟐𝟏𝑻𝒂𝒕𝒎[𝒕]𝟔.𝟕𝟔
. 
 
Figure A.1 plots the mitigation shares (panel a) and the associated mitigation expenditures (panel b). 
used in the scenarios in Figure 3. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Short run equilibrium as a function of 𝜻 and G. Higher 𝜻 lowers r and u and shifts the 
equilibrium to point B. An increase in 𝑮 shifts the system in similar fashion. 
  
Profit rate, 𝑟 
Capacity utilization, u 
𝑢(𝑟) 
𝑟(𝑢, 𝜁, 𝐺) 
A 
B 
𝑟(𝑢, 𝜁, 𝐺′)  
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Figure 2: The heavy lines are nullclines for 𝜿 and 𝜻, with a steady state at point 𝑺𝒑. 
Contour lines for ?̇? as a function of 𝑮 and 𝜻 are lightly shaded, with lower levels of ?̇? 
along contours further to the right. 
 
 
                                                                                             
𝜁 
𝐺 
?̇? < 0 
𝜁̇ = 0 
𝑆𝑝 
?̇? = 0 ?̇? > 0 
𝐺0   𝐺
∗ = 𝐺0 
full mitigation 
𝐺∗ 
partial mitigation 
𝑆𝑓 
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Figure 3: Illustrative simulations of the demand-driven model of economic growth and climate 
change. Climate policy which limits peak warming to 2°C (black) or 1.3°C (green) permits the 
economy to continue its current pattern of exponential growth with increasing levels of income 
and high levels of employment. Under BAU (red), the economy follow its current pattern for 
several decade while global mean temperature rapidly increases. Climate damage lowers 
profitability, output, capital accumulation and employment drastically. In equilibrium, income 
levels and labor productivity are low while temperature stabilizes at 7°C. 
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Figure A.1: Mitigation shares and expenditures for the mitigation scenarios 
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